Maripoldata Blog

Understanding Deep-Sea Life through marine scientific research: The case of Scripps Institution of Oceanography

6. February 2023/in General /by Ina Tessnow-von Wysocki

Since 2018, the MARIPOLDATA research team has followed the BBNJ negotiations and provided extensive insights of the diplomatic practices, science-policy interactions and conflicts shaping the development of a new high seas biodiversity treaty (Tessnow-von Wysocki & Vadrot, 2020; Vadrot, 2020; Vadrot et al. 2022). In parallel, we studied the emerging scientific field of marine biodiversity to understand the state of what scientists knew and delve into the global inequalities of the scientific field, which were reappearing at the negotiation sites (Tolochko & Vadrot 2021a, 2021b). To close the gap between the scientific field and the negotiations though, MARIPOLDATA has taken a closer look at the national level to study marine biodiversity monitoring policies and practices from the perspective of deep-sea laboratories. With the aim to compare these perspectives, the laboratory life of laboratories adds a new key site to understand the structure of the politics of marine biodiversity research entangled between science and policy.

This MARIPOLDATA blog series shares insights from three laboratory ethnographies undertaken between October and December 2022 by three researchers of the ERC MARIPOLDATA team. These ethnographies will take our readers to the United States at Scripps Oceanography[1] at the University of California San Diego, France at the IFREMER[2] of Brest and Brazil at the Oceanographic Institute[3] of São Paulo. Our intention in sharing three singular experiences of laboratory ethnography is to provide a first outlook of how national knowledge infrastructures produce marine biodiversity knowledge. We begin today with Ina’s stay at Scripps.

Ellen Browning Scripps Memorial Pier at Scripps Institution of Oceanography, La Jolla (Photo credits: Ina Tessnow-von Wysocki)

Diving into Deep-Sea Research at the Lab

Whenever you are standing at the beach and your eyes scroll over the infinite horizon; whenever you are at the railing of a ship looking out to the blue waves or diving down to explore the shallow waters to the point where your snorkelling or scuba gear will no longer let you descend further… Have you ever wondered what lives thousands of meters below the surface of the ocean?

You probably know of the deep sea – you might have seen deep-sea organisms on pictures, videos, or even on your own research cruises and in the laboratory. Maybe you are involved in the United Nations negotiations on marine biodiversity governance as an observer – or even as a negotiator – to follow and take decisions over the life that exists in international waters, down to thousands of meters below the surface. Maybe you have come across pharmaceutical companies that are using deep-sea organisms for product development, and have engaged in conversations about deep-seabed mining – all of which are highly controversial discussions at the global UN level nowadays.

Yet, the deep sea is still little-understood: Humans have more knowledge of other planets, than they have about the deepest parts of this blue planet called Earth (Levin et al., 2019; Smith, 2019). But we do know that there is life in these dark and cold spaces in several thousands of meters depth!

Deep-Sea Samples at the Levin Lab (Photo credits: Ina Tessnow-von Wysocki)

Before I visited the Levin Lab, I had already undertaken social science research on the deep sea for almost 4 years, studied the role of deep-sea science in global negotiations of the United Nations, talked to deep-sea scientists like Sylvia Earle, engaged with colleagues on discussions on marine genetic resources and marine scientific research capacity building, yet, I had never been so close to deep-sea life until I got to meet the Levin Lab.

At Scripps Institution of Oceanography, for the first time, I saw a deep-sea organism – I looked at the little creatures that had lived thousands of meters below the surface. As my hand was shaking, I did not get a clear photo of it – don’t drop it! How many hours must have gone into collecting, identifying, preserving, researching, storing it? How much research money must have gone into the research cruise collecting it? And what would still be possible with researching it in the future? I had heard about it so many times, met many people working on it, I had spoken and written about it, had seen pictures and videos of it, followed international negotiations that set regulations about it for the future – but I had never actually seen it. This is how my laboratory ethnography in the Levin Lab started.

Why Laboratory Ethnography at Scripps Institution of Oceanography?

Since 1903, Scripps Institution of Oceanography at University of California, San Diego has contributed to investigations of the ocean and atmosphere and is considered one of the most important centers for global earth science research and education in the world[1]. While Scripps research covers climate change impacts and adaptation, resilience to hazards, conservation and biodiversity, ocean and human health, national security, and innovative technology (ibid) to observe the planet – we would like to zoom into one specific laboratory: the Levin Lab.

The Levin Lab opening their doors on a social scientists’ eyes to life in the deep sea… f.l.t.r:. Angelica Bradley, Lisa Levin, Francis Nguyen, Ina Tessnow-von Wysocki, John Howel, Olivia Pereira, Carlos Neira and Guillermo Mendoza (Photo credits: Ina Tessnow-von Wysocki)

Prof. Lisa Levin is a Distinguished Professor Emerita at the Scripps Institution of Oceanography, University of California, San Diego. She served as Director of the Center for Marine Biodiversity and Conservation and Oliver Chair at Scripps from 2011-2017. Levin’s research interests include biodiversity and climate change impacts on deep-sea continental margin, and the application of deep-sea science to policy. Her lab studies benthic ecosystems in the deep sea and shallow water and has worked with a broad range of taxa, from microbes and microalgae to invertebrates, fishes and whales. Her recent research has emphasized 3 major themes: (1) the structure, function and vulnerability of continental margin ecosystems, particularly those subject to oxygen and sulfide stress, ocean acidification and deoxygenation; (2) wetland biotic interactions; and (3) larval ecology of coastal marine populations with emphasis on connectivity[2]. Levin’s deep-sea research has been conducted on over 50 expeditions to the margins of the Pacific, Indian and Atlantic Oceans using ships, submersibles, remotely operated vehicles (ROVs) and autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs) to observe, sample and conduct experiments. Now, after her retirement, there still remain seven lab members in the Levin Lab, working on the different projects that she oversees.

A regular day in the lab..?

Identifying species with the Levin Lab (Photo credits: Ina Tessnow-von Wysocki)

There was no one day like the other in my fieldwork – and this is also true for marine research in the Levin Lab. The two weeks enabled me to shadow the scientists in their meetings, classes, observe their lab work with the samples, identification of species under the microscope, and data analysis of research cruise pictures and videos. Not only is the team diverse in their academic and cultural backgrounds, including researchers from Chile, Brazil, Mexico and the United States, but also the projects they work on within the Levin Lab include different geographical regions with study sites in Southern California, the deep Alaska continental margin and Costa Rica, with research topics ranging from studying effects of DDT waste barrels in a previous industrial dumpsite in the San Pedro basin of Los Angeles; exploration and characterization of microbial and animal biodiversity in the Southern California Borderland; over effects of phosphorite and ferro-manganese crusts on the biology; to studying methane seeps in Costa Rica and hypoxia in coastal estuaries.

The Levin Lab is working on a range of different types of data: during the cruise they collect temperature, salinity, oxygen values for the water, sometimes turbidity, light, or fluorescence. The hyrographic data are automatically sent to the national database Rolling deck to repository (R2R). Moreover, the biological data are very labor-intensive and can take months to years to generate because the scientists in the Levin Lab have to sort the invertebrates out of the samples and measure the properties of the sediments and fauna (MARIPOLDATA Interview with Lisa Levin, 2022). The Levin Lab scientists then use both the physical samples, as well as pictures and videos from the cruises to map and understand the benthic communities.

There was also time to get a sense of the work of other Scripps laboratories, such as getting to know about gene sequences at Greg Rouse’s Lab and taking a tour through the benthic invertebrate collection of amazing deep-sea creatures.
Besides getting to know the day-to-day work of Scripps scientists, I also conducted semi-structured interviews to understand how they became scientists, their motivations, what fascinates them in research, and got insights into their time on the vessel, and other moments that I could not capture in the little snapshot of two-week laboratory ethnography. What is it like to be on the submarine Alvin – what crosses a scientist’s mind when descending several thousands of metres down into the depth of the ocean? What are opportunities, challenges and fears of individual scientists when it comes to funding their research? And what do the United States provide as national infrastructures for monitoring marine biodiversity and supporting science?

Benthic Invertebrate Collection, Scripps Institution of Oceanography

Through desk research and interviews, I could identify the conditions and obligations of US scientists, as regards the national and international regulations for their research. While scientists require a research permit in foreign waters, in US waters 3 miles off shore and when conducting research in US sanctuaries, marine scientific research in international waters is currently possible without a permit as regulated under the freedom of scientific research under UNCLOS (Art. 87 (f)). As US federal funders generally require a data management plan in their grant proposals, scientists will thus commit to uploading their data to specific databases. While making data available to all is desirable, some databases fit certain types of data better than others – e.g. Genbank works well for genetic sequence data – there is currently “no nice, easy home for ecological community data” (MARIPOLDATA Interview with Lisa Levin, 2022), the type of data that the Levin Lab is collecting.

When Science meets Policy

Photo taken through the microscope

Some things are so small, your eyes cannot see them, so far away, you might never reach them and so different you may not be able to ever relate to them. But still, they are there and they are alive, in the deepest places of our ocean. The research of the Levin Lab is significant for international policy-making on global ocean and marine biodiversity governance because it seeks to understand life on the bottom of our ocean (benthic communities) and the conditions the deep-sea animals need to strive, as well as the implications that their existence has on surrounding ecosystems.

Lisa Levin is increasingly involved with policy through her engagement in different international fora. She is co-founder and co-lead of the Deep-Ocean Stewardship Initiative (DOSI)[3], author on the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Special Report on The Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate, active participant at the Conferences of the Parties (COPs) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and co-lead of the Deep Ocean Observing Strategy (DOOS)[4]. Apart from being involved in the intersections between science and policy herself, she also encourages early career researchers to get involved in communicating their research to policy-makers and the public. For this reason, the Levin Lab was also engaged in the first ever Climate Ocean Pavilion at a 27^th climate conference of the parties (COP27) with Scripps[5]. International policy topics that she is recently engaged in are the link between climate change and the deep sea (Bris & Levin, 2020; Levin, 2019, 2021; Levin et al., 2020) and pointing to the risks of deep-seabed mining (Levin et al., 2016).

Reflecting on the two weeks of laboratory ethnography at Scripps Institution of Oceanography at the Levin Lab, this time provided me with – not just increased knowledge about the deep ocean – but also with incredible experiences and insights into the laboratory work, the situation researchers face, their motivations and a better understanding of marine science in the United States. Throughout 2023, the MARIPOLDATA team will be able to use the data to compare it to the other cases of Brazil and the EU.

At the MARIPOLDATA Ocean Seminar Climate Change and the Deep Sea: Science-Policy perspectives, Lisa Levin gave insights into how climate change and the deep sea are interconnected and should therefore also be in global policy-making. While the science points to the importance of these links, climate change seems to still be marginalized in ocean discussions. Maybe science could be better integrated into global ocean governance through an Intergovernmental Panel for Ocean Sustainability (Gaill et al., 2022)..?

[1] https://scripps.ucsd.edu/about

[2] https://llevin.scrippsprofiles.ucsd.edu/bio/

[3] DOSI integrates science, technology, policy, law and economics to advise on ecosystem-based management of resource use in the deep ocean and strategies to maintain the integrity of deep-ocean ecosystems within and beyond national jurisdictions.

[4] a program within the Global Ocean Observing System (GOOS) which aims to coordinate deep ocean-observing to address needs of climate science and society.

[5] https://scripps.ucsd.edu/news/meet-uc-san-diego-delegates-headed-egypt-un-climate-conference

[1] https://scripps.ucsd.edu/

[2] https://www.ifremer.fr/fr

[3] https://www.io.usp.br/

References

Bris, N. L., & Levin, L. A. (2020). 161Climate change cumulative impacts on deep-sea ecosystems. In Natural Capital and Exploitation of the Deep Ocean (pp. 0). doi:10.1093/oso/9780198841654.003.0009

Gaill, F., Brodie Rudolph, T., Lebleu, L., Allemand, D., Blasiak, R., Cheung, W. W. L., . . . Poivre d’Arvor, O. (2022). An evolution towards scientific consensus for a sustainable ocean future. npj Ocean Sustainability, 1(1), 7. doi:10.1038/s44183-022-00007-1

Levin, L. A. (2019). Oceanography (Washington, D.C.), 32, 180. doi:10.5670/oceanog.2019.224

Levin, L. A. (2021). IPCC and the Deep Sea: A Case for Deeper Knowledge. Frontiers in Climate, 3. Retrieved from https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fclim.2021.720755

Levin, L. A., Bett, B. J., Gates, A. R., Heimbach, P., Howe, B. M., Janssen, F., . . . Weller, R. A. (2019). Global Observing Needs in the Deep Ocean. 6(241). doi:10.3389/fmars.2019.00241

Levin, L. A., Mengerink, K., Gjerde, K. M., Rowden, A. A., Van Dover, C. L., Clark, M. R., . . . Brider, J. (2016). Defining “serious harm” to the marine environment in the context of deep-seabed mining. Marine Policy, 74, 245-259. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2016.09.032

Levin, L. A., Wei, C.-L., Dunn, D. C., Amon, D. J., Ashford, O. S., Cheung, W. W. L., . . . Yasuhara, M. (2020). Climate change considerations are fundamental to management of deep-sea resource extraction. Global Change Biology, 26(9), 4664-4678. doi:https://doi.org/10.1111/gcb.15223

Smith, N. (2019). Engineering & technology, 14, 63. doi:10.1049/et.2019.0706

Tessnow-von Wysocki, I., & Vadrot, A. B. M. (2020). The Voice of Science on Marine Biodiversity Negotiations: A Systematic Literature Review. Frontiers in Marine Science, 7. Retrieved from https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fmars.2020.614282

Vadrot, A. B. M. (2020). Multilateralism as a ‘site’ of struggle over environmental knowledge: the North-South divide. Critical Policy Studies, 14(2), 233-245. doi:10.1080/19460171.2020.1768131

Vadrot, A. B. M., Langlet, A., Tessnow-von Wysocki, I., Tolochko, P., Brogat, E., & Ruiz-Rodríguez, S. C. (2021). Marine Biodiversity Negotiations During COVID-19: A New Role for Digital Diplomacy? Global Environmental Politics, 1-18. doi:10.1162/glep_a_00605

Diving into Marine Issues of the Global Biodiversity Framework: How global will the new biodiversity framework be?

6. December 2022/in General /by Ina Tessnow-von Wysocki

Member States to the United Nations are now meeting in Montreal, Canada to adopt the Post-2020 Global Biodiversity Framework (GBF)[1]. An Open-ended Working Group was tasked to prepare the draft text prior to the upcoming Conference of the Parties (COP). As outstanding issues remained unresolved[2], time for discussions was extended further. The MARIPOLDATA team closely followed the preparations for the Post-2020 Biodiversity Framework since October 2021 with the first virtual session of COP15, followed by on-site participation in the Working Group Meetings in Geneva in March 2022, Nairobi in June 2022 and are represented in Montreal, Canada for the 5^th meeting, as well as COP15, in December 2022. This blog provides an overview of marine-related issues in the current draft of the new GBF that are also relevant to the upcoming negotiations for a legally-binding instrument for the conservation and sustainable use of marine diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction (BBNJ)[3].

Photo by Kris-Mikael Krister on Unsplash

A Framework for the World to live in Harmony with Nature by 2050

The global biodiversity crisis is not new to policy-makers around the globe – the recognition that biodiversity loss is happening at an accelerating rate has led to many efforts to reverse biodiversity loss on national, regional and international levels. However, with the realisation that business-as-usual cannot lead to transformative change to reverse biodiversity loss, world leaders are now coming together to agree on action-oriented targets to “immediately” respond to the biodiversity crisis and to “put biodiversity on the path to recovery” in the next 10 years[4]. The first draft of the GBF includes a mission for 2030, a vision for 2050 and milestones to assess along the way to guarantee successful implementation of the framework. Moreover, the framework sets out 22 specific targets to be focused on, covering the themes a) reducing threats to biodiversity, b) meeting people’s needs through sustainable use and benefit-sharing, c) tools and solutions for implementation and mainstreaming.

Representatives from governments, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), academia and research last gathered in Nairobi, Kenya to draft the Post-2020 GBF to achieve living in harmony with nature by 2050. After the extended 5^th session shortly before the upcoming conference, the draft will then be finalised and open for adoption at COP15 in Montreal, Canada under the presidency of China (7 to 19 December 2022).

Joining Ocean and Biodiversity efforts for a new Global Framework

There is no doubt we live on a blue planet with more than two-thirds covered by ocean. The ocean constitutes over 90 % of the habitable space on Earth, containing around 250,000 known species – not to speak of the significant biodiversity that is yet unknown to science[5]. The most recent 5^thGlobal Biodiversity Outlook[6] and the Second Global Ocean Assessment[7] emphasise the continuous and increasing marine biodiversity loss, driven by human activities. Stressors include (over)fishing, exploitation of other marine resources, such as minerals, intentional and unintentional marine pollution, including plastic, chemicals and toxicants from shipping, tourism and the military, as well as noise pollution. Moreover, there are risks of further degradation of the marine environment and increased biodiversity loss by future (not yet authorised) activities; the most prevalent being deep sea-bed mining (Miller et al., 2021; Amon et al., 2022). The above-mentioned activities are stressors on biodiversity with uncertain consequences that might extend beyond our predictions and imagination. For the well-being of the planet and people, it is thus evident to put efforts into protecting marine biodiversity and the new GBF is a crucial step forward in reversing marine biodiversity loss.

The ocean is interconnected, but is often not treated this way in international law: The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) divides the ocean into different maritime zones for governance and jurisdiction (Tessnow-von Wysocki & Vadrot, 2022). 64% of the ocean space (which is 95% of its volume!) is considered to be “international waters” or “the high seas”, which are the areas that do not fall under national jurisdiction of any state. The international effort to negotiate a new agreement on marine biodiversity conservation and sustainable use (beyond national jurisdiction) is underway and many links to the GBF can be observed. Relevance to marine biodiversity can be found in several parts of the framework by aiming to protect and sustainably use biodiversity. In this blog, we focus on the GBF targets in each of the three themes that are most relevant to the upcoming negotiations for a legally-binding agreement for the conservation and sustainable use of marine biodiversity beyond national jurisdiction.

A) Reducing threats to marine biodiversity

During the Nairobi meetings, the Blue Leaders[8], a group of states calling for 30% of protected ocean areas made a joint intervention, reiterating the importance of the world’s ocean and pointing to current stressors including climate change, depleted fish stocks, unsustainable and illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing activities. The group agrees on the importance of protecting the ocean by 2030 “meaningfully” – that is to not simply establish “paper parks” (= protected areas that exist on paper but have no actual impact) but to effectively prevent destructive uses through implementation. Goal A pursues to reduce threats to biodiversity, particularly Targets 1-3 make explicit mention to marine issues and spatial planning but included much contestation among governments in past meetings: Foreseeing divergence on key issues, an informal “friends of the co-leads” group was called together to discuss terminology across targets 1-3. Discussions included multiple views of states as regards the scope of the GBF: Views parted in the terminology of “land and sea” versus “land and ocean” areas. Moreover, a number of states also rejected the terminology “areas”, preferring reference to “ecosystems”. Divergence also existed on the definition of ecosystems, namely the difference between “all” ecosystems versus a specific listing of ecosystem (e.g. “terrestrial, inland water, freshwater, marine, and coastal ecosystems”).

Despite extensive informal discussions in the informal setting, as well as the formal contact group meetings and a long night session until the early morning hours, disagreement remained until the end of the conference on such terminology. While the majority of negotiators supported the inclusion of the entire ocean, some parties would like to limit the target to waters under national jurisdiction, and thereby exclude the high seas. Discussions also included divergence on references to human rights and Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities (IPLCs) and related conventions. Placeholders were set on these contested issues, which means that the negotiation of such issues was postponed to the ongoing meeting in Canada.

These targets are particularly interesting for the upcoming BBNJ negotiations regarding area-based management tools, including marine protected areas. The GBF could in this way be the guidance for immediate action on area-based management tools for the conservation and sustainable use of marine biodiversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction, which could be implemented through the new BBNJ instrument. Moreover, the overall section of reducing threats to biodiversity also indirectly speak to the regulation of the conduct of environmental impact assessments (EIAs), for which the BBNJ instrument also has a mandate for.

B) Meeting people’s needs through sustainable use and benefit-sharing of marine genetic resources

Also particularly interesting to both negotiators in the CBD and BBNJ discussions is Target 13, as it regards the aim to facilitate access to genetic resources and to ensure fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from the use of genetic resources. Discussions in the CBD and BBNJ are very similar in this regard, when it comes to issues on, not only access to and sharing of benefits of the physical sample of the genetic resource, but also other data related to the genetic resource, such as digital sequence information (DSI). It will be important to coordinate negotiations to harmonise, rather than duplicate, efforts in both fora.

C) Tools and solutions for implementation and mainstreaming

Target 20 of the current draft seeks to guarantee that relevant knowledge guides decision-making for the effective management of biodiversity. On a similar vein, BBNJ envisages a Scientific and Technical Body to provide a scientific base for implementation of the agreement that will need to correspond to other forms of knowledge, apart from scientific research. One pillar of the BBNJ instrument is capacity building and transfer of marine technology to guarantee advancements in marine scientific research and the inclusion of knowledge of Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities to support the effective implementation of the agreement. Coordination in this regard would ensure that advancing ocean science and embracing different knowledge systems under the BBNJ instrument contributes to holistic biodiversity governance envisaged by the GBF.

All eyes on the GBF – and on BBNJ: What happens next?

Negotiators meet in December 2022 to adopt the new Global Biodiversity Framework and the negotiations for a legally-binding agreement for the conservation and sustainable use of marine biodiversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction (BBNJ) will conclude early next year.

Links between BBNJ and the GBF are obvious:

The BBNJ negotiations include the topic of access to and fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from marine genetic resources in areas beyond national jurisdiction and questions on a future Access and Benefit Sharing Mechanism (ABS). Questions on DSI of (marine) genetic resources are part of target 13 of the GBF and discussions need to be coordinated across the different fora.
The BBNJ instrument will have the mandate to establish Area-based management tools (ABMTs), including marine protected areas (MPAs) in areas beyond national jurisdiction, which directly link to the spatial planning targets 1-3 of the GBF. It is crucial that the GBF refers to the entire ocean – as opposed to marine areas under national jurisdiction – in order to be a global framework.
The BBNJ agreement will regulate the conduct of environmental impact assessments (EIAs) in areas beyond national jurisdiction, which will respond to efforts to conserve and sustainably use of global biodiversity. Target 15 of the GBF refers to the environmental impact assessments to be conducted by all businesses to determine their footprint and dependencies on biodiversity.
The final pillar of the BBNJ agreement regards capacity building and the transfer of marine technology (CBTMT), which relates to target 20 of the GBF. A future Scientific and Technical Body for BBNJ will need to ensure relevant knowledge is available for decision-making and management of biodiversity.

It is crucial that there is coordination between the negotiations for the BBNJ treaty and the GBF when it comes to questions of terminology, scope and state obligations in order to effectively conserve and sustainably use marine biodiversity. While areas beyond national jurisdiction are supposed to fall into the BBNJ instrument’s mandate, future implementation would still benefit from the guidance of the global biodiversity framework, which – by its title – cannot exclude certain marine areas.

The meeting of the Open-Ended Working Group in Nairobi left many questions unanswered and after additional discussions in an Informal Group in September[9], much pressure rests on negotiators of the final 5^th Open-Ended Working Group to streamline the text as best as possible before the start of the COP. Not an easy task with around 900 brackets remaining (text that has not been agreed upon)[10]: The draft text is not clear in many of the targets and time is running, but more importantly, like Executive Secretary of the Convention on Biological Diversity, Elizabeth Mrema, said: “Biodiversity cannot wait.” There is the hope that with only a few days left to negotiate, states will show more flexibility in their positions and approach one another in the spirit of compromise. While the overall aim is to develop a framework for the world on how to protect, sustainably use and share benefits deriving from biodiversity in the next decades to come, it is yet to be seen, how holistic and global the framework will be drafted for final adoption at the upcoming COP15.

Negotiators from both fora need to coordinate efforts so that the global road map corresponds to the realities on the ground. Efforts to setting global targets and creating institutions to implement them should go hand in hand. The fact that these processes are simultaneously happening can be an advantage in ensuring clearly formulated targets and the development of institutions that can lead to successful implementation and take immediate, urgent action, aligned under one common purpose: our vision for 2050. The Convention on Biological Diversity and the Convention on the Law of the Sea might be two different conventions, with distinct mandates – but if you think about it there is much more that unites them: The same governments are negotiating in these fora, taking decisions about the same planet – having the same objective: conserving and sustainably using biodiversity.

A big thank you to the High Seas Alliance and Deep Ocean Stewardship Initiative who funded my conference participation to attend the 4^th Open-Ended Working Group Meeting in Nairobi and the MARIPOLDATA team who conducted digital ethnography from Vienna.

[1] https://www.cbd.int/conferences/post2020

[2] https://www.maripoldata.eu/an-ocean-of-possibilities-marine-biodiversity-in-the-post-2020-global-biodiversity-framework/

[3] https://www.un.org/bbnj/

[4] First draft of the GBF: https://www.cbd.int/doc/c/abb5/591f/2e46096d3f0330b08ce87a45/wg2020-03-03-en.pdf

[5]https://www.un.org/en/chronicle/article/marine-biodiversity-and-ecosystems-underpin-healthy-planet-and-social-well-being

[6] P.156. Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity (2020) Global Biodiversity Outlook 5. Montreal: https://www.cbd.int/gbo/gbo5/publication/gbo-5-en.pdf

[7] https://www.un.org/regularprocess/sites/www.un.org.regularprocess/files/2011859-e-woa-ii-vol-ii.pdf

[8] https://www.theblueleaders.org/

[9] https://www.cbd.int/doc/c/dfeb/e742/b936c09eae9dd558c1310b5b/wg2020-05-02-en.pdf

[10] Daily CBD Press Briefing: https://www.youtube.com/watch?app=desktop&v=9IFs-vzAC8c&feature=youtu.be

References

Amon, D. J., Gollner, S., Morato, T., Smith, C. R., Chen, C., Christiansen, S., . . . Pickens, C. (2022). Assessment of scientific gaps related to the effective environmental management of deep-seabed mining. Marine Policy, 138, 105006. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2022.105006

Miller, K. A., Brigden, K., Santillo, D., Currie, D., Johnston, P., & Thompson, K. F. (2021). Challenging the Need for Deep Seabed Mining From the Perspective of Metal Demand, Biodiversity, Ecosystems Services, and Benefit Sharing. Frontiers in Marine Science, 8. doi: https://doi.org/10.3389/fmars.2021.706161

Tessnow-von Wysocki., I., & Vadrot, A., B. M. . (2022). Governing a divided ocean: The transformative power of ecological connectivity in the BBNJ negotiations. Politics and governance, 10, 28. doi:https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v10i3.5428

Wait a second… were multilateral negotiations not online before COVID-19? The emergence of digital multilateralism

18. October 2022/in General /by MARIPOLDATA Team

By Silvia Ruiz and Alice Vadrot

This blog post has also been published on the website of the Research Platform: Governance of Digital Practices

This contribution presents our new paper tackling the online discussions about an international legally binding instrument under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction (BBNJ). Such online discussions took place during the first two years of the COVID-19 pandemic as the fourth intergovernmental conference (IGC4) was postponed until 2022. We include developments from the online Intersessional Work organized by the UN Secretariat since September 2020, and the virtual High Seas Treaty Dialogues, taking place under Chatham House rules, organized by 3 states and a number of NGOs.

Multilateral negotiations are a simultaneous process constituted by different factors:

several state actors who usually need to agree on multiple issues in a certain time frame,
several non-state actors – Indigenous People and Local Communities, media, NGOs, scientific community – who try to influence the outcome of such negotiations, and
a venue where multilateral negotiations take place (Betsill & Corell, 2008; Chasek, 2001; Coleman, 2011; Craggs and Mahony, 2014; Henrikson, 2005; Morin et al., 2020; Salacuse and Rubin, 1990; Suiseeya, 2014; Suiseeya & Zanotti, 2019; Touval, 1989; UNEP, 2007).

Example of multilateral negotiation: United Nations Working Group on Nuclear Disarmament in May 2016. Source: ICAN-Australia, CC BY-SA 4.0 <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0>, via Wikimedia Commons

These factors turn multilateral negotiations into a highly complex process that requires structured procedures in order be carried out in an orderly manner (Chasek, 2001; Winham, 1977). For instance, non-state actors speak after state actors (Aeschlimann & Regan, 2017, p. 47), and decisions are made on the basis of consensus – that is to say, abstentions are affirmative votes (Zartman, 1994, p. 5) and one negative vote hinders the making of a decision.

Structured procedures aid diplomats to create an “environment of trust” because they provide predictability and precedence (Chasek, 2021, p. 5). Also, face-to-face diplomatic encounters facilitate cooperation (Chasek, 2021; Holmes, 2013); and they take place in venues, which can provide a precedent if they have hosted similar negotiations and can be a source of mistrust if they have failed to do so (Coleman, 2011).

It follows that trustful multilateral negotiations only take place in person, most probably in ‘known’ venues and state delegates refrain from using videoconference tools for diplomatic encounters. In simple words, state delegates delayed multilateral negotiations if they could not meet in person despite the use of some digital tools by state delegates, such as word processing programs and email in order to aid negotiations (Adler-Nissen and Drieschova, 2019), and by Indigenous People and Local Communities, such as social media and online interfaces in order to bring their claims forward (Suiseeya and Zanotti, 2019).

Empty negotiation room at the World Trade Organization. Source: https://www.wita.org/blogs/reform-at-wto-divisions-continue/

Delaying multilateral negotiations became problematic after the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic as international negotiations were postponed indefinitely, such as the fourth session of the negotiations for a new legally binding instrument to conserve and sustainably use marine Biodiversity in areas Beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ Negotiations). In face of such uncertainty, unprecedented digital multilateral sites emerged to facilitate exchange among delegates during the pandemic: the “High Seas Dialogue,” where delegates communicate via videoconference, and the “BBNJ Intersessional Work,” where delegates exchanged positions via written chat and later via videoconference (Vadrot et al., 2021; Vadrot & Ruiz Rodríguez, 2022).

Marine turtle. Source: https://www.rawpixel.com/search/green%20sea%20turtle?page=1&sort=curated

We asked whether these sites could “replace in-person diplomatic practice, under which conditions, and what effects this would have” on policymaking (Vadrot & Ruiz Rodríguez, 2022, p. 2). We observed all discussion sessions of the High Seas Dialogue and BBNJ Intersessional Work. We focused on struggles and processes of change as these might be relevant if digital multilateral negotiations become the ‘new normal’ in the years to come (Chasek, 2021).

These digital multilateral sites have created new inequalities and reinforced existing ones in the making of the BBNJ Instrument. For instance, small delegations have not been able to participate in all sessions, and videoconferences have taken place during the afternoon of Central European Time, which is suitable for Europe and the Americas but not for Pacific states (i.a., Australia, New Zealand, Palau, Samoa) (Vadrot & Ruiz Rodríguez, 2022). Moreover, online discussions lack translation services, making English the de facto language of digital debates.

World time zones. Source: Goran tek-en, CC BY-SA 4.0 <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0>, via Wikimedia Commons

Beyond these inequalities, digital multilateral sites are politically relevant because diplomats:

follow structured procedures,
perform new practices,
reach convergence on issues they had not discussed previously,
continue struggles that have taken place since the beginning of the negotiations, and
develop a better understanding of each other’s positions in digital multilateral sites (Vadrot & Ruiz Rodríguez, 2022).

Thus, the digitalization of multilateralism is a “key change factor for diplomatic practice in the twenty-first century” due to the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as technological advancements, and despite the difficulties to build trust in virtual encounters (Chasek, 2021; Vadrot & Ruiz Rodríguez, 2022, p. 2; Vadrot et al., 2021). Digital multilateral sites are part of digital multilateralism, which we define as

“[1] a set of digital and physical diplomatic practices [2] performed across space and time [3] by state and non-state actors [4] engaged in a joint enterprise of simultaneous negotiation [5] through physical and digital infrastructures [6] in information-rich, highly interactive environments” (Vadrot & Ruiz Rodríguez, 2022, p. 3).

What will the future bring?

Personal conferences are still preferred over digital ones (Allan et al., 2021; Chasek, 2021). However, online discussions offer a unique opportunity to advance work 1) in regional multilateral meetings as time differences might be mild or non-existent and 2) in global multilateral meetings as discussions could be scheduled at different times to adjust to the time zones of participating states (Chasek, 2021; Henrikson, 2005). Moreover, the use of digital multilateral sites would reduce the travel footprint of in-person conferences (Allan et al., 2021; Chasek, 2021).

Seaside footprints. Source: https://pxhere.com/en/photo/695472

Hybrid encounters – combining in-person and digital participation – have offered a way forward as exemplified by the meetings of the Convention on Biological Diversity in Geneva in March 2022 (read our blog article on this regard) and in Nairobi in June 2022. Although issues of equity and fairness have not yet been solved, multilateralism is facing an era of unprecedented digitalization whose implications we will continue to research. Stay tuned!

References

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Allan, J., Soubry, B., Rosen, T., & Tsioumani, E. (2021). State of Global Environmental Governance 2020. Report, International Institute for Sustainable Development, Canada, February.

Betsill, M., & Corell, E. (2008). Introduction to NGO Diplomacy. In NGO Diplomacy: The Influence of Nongovernmental Organizations in International Environmental Negotiations (pp. 1-18). MIT Press.

Chasek, Pamela S. 2001. Earth Negotiations: Analyzing Thirty Years of Environmental Diplomacy. Tokyo: United Nations University Press.

Chasek, Pamela. 2021. “Is It the End of the COP as We Know It? An Analysis of the First Year of Virtual Meetings in the UN Environment and Sustainable Development Arena.” International Negotiation 27: 1-32.

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Suiseeya, K. R. M. (2014). Negotiating the Nagoya Protocol: Indigenous demands for justice. Global Environmental Politics, 14(3), 102-124.

Suiseeya, Kimberly R. M., and Laura Zanotti. 2019. “Making influence visible: innovating ethnography at the Paris Climate Summit.” Global Environmental Politics 19 (2): 38-60.

Touval, Saadia. 1989 “Multilateral negotiation: An analytic approach.” Negotiation Journal 5(2): 159-173.

UNEP. 2007. Guide for Negotiators of Multilateral Environmental Agreements. Nairobi: UNEP. https://wedocs.unep.org/handle/20.500.11822/7496?show=full.

Vadrot, Alice B. M., Arne Langlet, Ina Tessnow-von Wysocki, Petro Tolochko, Emmanuelle Brogat and Silvia C. Ruiz-Rodríguez. 2021. Marine Biodiversity Negotiations During COVID-19: A New Role for Digital Diplomacy?. Global Environmental Politics 21(3): 1-18.

Vadrot, A. B. M., & Ruiz Rodríguez, S. C. (2022). Digital multilateralism in practice: Extending critical policy ethnography to digital negotiation sites. International Studies Quarterly, 66(3), sqac051. https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqac051

Winham, Gilbert R. 1977. “Complexity in International Negotiation.” In Negotiations: Social- Psychological Perspectives, edited by Daniel Druckman, 347-366. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.

Zartman, I. William. 1994. “Two’s Company and More’s a Crowd: The Complexities of Multilateral Negotiation.” In International Multilateral Negotiation: Approaches to the Management of Complexity, edited by I. William Zartman, 1-10. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

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