Maripoldata Blog

Life in the Ocean – a common heritage of the planet: Do we have a responsibility in the High Seas?

20. February 2023/in General /by Ina Tessnow-von Wysocki

This contribution is part of a MARIPOLDATA blog series on current developments and discussions about marine biodiversity negotiations – more specifically, 1) the negotiations towards an international legally binding instrument under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction (BBNJ) and 2) the second part of 15^th Conference of the Parties (COP15.2) to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). This blog post reflects on the ongoing BBNJ negotiations and the missing aspect of acknowledging the intrinsic value of nature – apart from economic considerations. It dives into the debate on our responsibility to protect the ocean for current, future generations and the planet as a whole and challenges policy-makers in the BBNJ negotiations to consider this aspect as underlying principle of the BBNJ agreement.

Source: Pixabay

Why of common concern…?

The MARIPOLDATA Team has explored the disagreements of States over the years regarding the Principle of “Common Heritage of Humankind” in international law (Vadrot, Langlet, & Tessnow-von Wysocki, 2021). Our research shows how the political discussions surrounding the principle play out in the ongoing negotiations for the conservation and sustainable use of marine biodiversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction. It highlights and explains the different rationales of States to support or reject the inclusion of the idea to ensure that living resources are a “common heritage of humankind”, implying the need for its conservation and sustainable use for the benefit of all humankind.

To put the principle into context, it helps to revisit where it is mentioned in the preamble of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea:

“Desiring by this Convention to develop the principles embodied in resolution 2749 (XXV) of 17 December 1970 in which the General Assembly of the United Nations solemnly declared inter alia that the area of the seabed and ocean floor and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, as well as its resources, are the common heritage of mankind, the exploration and exploitation of which shall be carried out for the benefit of mankind as a whole, irrespective of the geographical location of States “ (UNCLOS, Preamble)

The principle of common heritage of humankind has been used by developing countries to contest the current inequality gap between countries of the Global North and Global South; and it offers food for thought on how benefits can be fairly and equitably shared among humankind, rather than concentrating wealth in a handful of States. Yet, the principle has been strongly instrumentalised to serve solely financial considerations, rather than conservation aspects. The original objective of introducing the principle into international law was to “ensure that ocean’s plenitude continued to sustain present and future generations and that its uses contributed to peace, security, and the equitable development of peoples” (Taylor, 2019).

Nowadays, it is almost solely linked to the economic benefits of nature for humans and within the BBNJ negotiations almost exclusively mentioned in the section on marine genetic resources and access to and fair and equitable sharing of benefits deriving from them. A human-centric view on nature has been criticized previously in debates on the commonly-used term “ecosystem services” (Schröter et al., 2014) and alternative framings now include “nature’s contributions to people” within the context of the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) and the Convention on Biological Diversity (Borie & Hulme, 2015). Taking the conservation angle to the common heritage principle would imply to only explore and exploit to an extent where it benefits all humankind – which in some cases would mean limited or no exploration and exploitation if greater benefit is achieved through preserving the marine environment.

While it is of course desirable to strive for the benefit of humankind, we should even go beyond humankind – and strive for the benefit of the planet as a whole. Scholars have already pointed to the need to phrase the concept more broadly to account for the intrinsic value of nature and the connection between humans and ecological systems, such as ‘common heritage of all life’ (Taylor, 2019). The human right to a clean, healthy, and sustainable environment is already recognized and addresses conservation and sustainable use for the benefit of humankind (UNGA, 2022). In BBNJ, some wording would now be needed that includes the consideration of humankind and extend it to rights of nature.

In the light of debates on “the rights of nature” (Harden-Davies et al., 2020), there is still room at the global level to engage with these ideas.

Is it all about the money..?

With the beginnings of the negotiations, research already pointed early to the lack of funding for conservation in ABNJ and suggested channelling monetary benefits arising from MGRs in ABNJ into a biodiversity fund (Tvedt & Jørem, 2013). Such a fund was envisaged to support conservation projects by state- and non-state actors on the one hand and foster “scientific research projects relating to the loss of marine biodiversity or understanding marine life and diversity” on the other hand (Tvedt & Jørem, 2013, p. 155, own emphasis). The current draft text includes a Financial mechanism (BBNJ draft, Art.52), which seeks to cover costs for the implementation of the agreement (conservation and sustainable use).

The objective of the BBNJ treaty is the “conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction”. Yet, with efforts to balance conservation and sustainable use, to date, the actual balance of the two pillars in our ocean is merely mentioned. To equally balance conservation and sustainable use actions on the high seas, one needs to evaluate the current status of marine biodiversity.

Continuing with “business as usual” would include much sustainable (and quite some unsustainable) use of marine biodiversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction. Yet, the conservation aspect of marine biodiversity in ABNJ is currently shockingly low (Karan & Clark, 2020). There is definitely no equal balance between conservation and sustainable use in our ocean currently, with (sustainable) use activities overshadowing efforts for conservation. The BBNJ agreement now offers an opportunity to reverse this trend and introduce ocean conservation efforts.

Who decides…?

Because the ocean is a global common and does not fall under the jurisdiction of any state, it needs to be governed jointly by all. Ocean protection can therefore be regarded as everyone’s concern and responsibility. It would thus also imply that everyone has a voice when it comes to governing, protecting and using the global commons and that no unilateral decisions over these spaces are made. Ideas that go further than a participatory approach include voices for non-humans, such as the consideration of animal rights and the environment, to ensure that natural resources – especially outside of national boundaries – are not solely governed for the benefit of the human population. Critics might say, we should not take responsibility for the ocean, we should not seek to govern it. Yet, we can govern our own actions within the ocean to reverse and prevent further damage.

Considering the common heritage (of the planet) principle for the BBNJ agreement would require to regard biodiversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction as “belonging to all but owned by none” (Taylor, 2019). The principle subjects sovereign authority by individual nation states to limitations – or ecological responsibilities – to serve the interests and well-being of all (Taylor, 2019). Thus, when it comes to decisions over areas beyond national jurisdiction, there is a need for governance in a transparent and internationalized manner, including – besides states – also all other actors in the process.

Source: Pixabay

Moving towards living in harmony with the ocean

The Global Biodiversity framework is a recently adopted document under the Convention on Biological Diversity and recognises the need for living in harmony with nature, and for taking urgent actions towards “transformative change” (Convention on Biological Diversity, 2022; Díaz et al., 2020). It refers to an eco-centric way of seeing and regulating biodiversity – not for the benefit of humans alone, but rather acknowledging the interlinkage between humans and the ecological system as the basis for social, economic and financial models. The vision of the new Global Biodiversity Framework is ambitious: living in harmony with nature by 2050. It even includes references to eco-centric approaches and valuing nature for what it is, not for its economic benefit to humans. Why is it then that almost simultaneously to the adoption of this ambitious biodiversity framework under the Convention on Biological Diversity, the same States seem to prioritize economic prosperity and territory over protecting nature in international negotiations for the conservation and sustainable use of marine biodiversity beyond national jurisdiction? How is the GBF going to be implemented if not through legally-binding regulations on global, national and local levels? Would an emerging legally-binding marine biodiversity agreement not be the perfect opportunity to introduce such change and translate it into national laws?

The upcoming final round of negotiations provides the opportunity to draft a new legally-binding agreement for people and the planet as a whole, thus, the intrinsic value of nature going beyond economic considerations is crucial to be incorporated into the legal text. While at the time of the UNCLOS negotiations little was known about the threats to marine ecosystems and species, today it is clear that human activities can and are already affecting marine biodiversity.

Particularly towards the last days of negotiation, policy-makers need to call to mind that this agreement should not solely be about meeting individual States’ interests, but rather it is a global common treaty that needs to be representative of the planet as a whole. State delegates, thus, are now spokespersons not only for their country, ministry, political party, and constituency – but additionally for the ones that have no voice: future generations and ocean life. For the individual negotiator, this is a huge opportunity to finalise an agreement for the world. But at the same time, it bears a tremendous responsibility – the responsibility to protect this planet for current and future life on Earth.

Source: Pixabay

References

Borie, M., & Hulme, M. (2015). Framing global biodiversity: IPBES between mother earth and ecosystem services. Environmental Science & Policy, 54, 487-496. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2015.05.009

Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework, (2022).

Díaz, S., Zafra-Calvo, N., Purvis, A., Verburg Peter, H., Obura, D., Leadley, P., . . . Zanne Amy, E. (2020). Set ambitious goals for biodiversity and sustainability. Science, 370(6515), 411-413. doi:10.1126/science.abe1530

Harden-Davies, H., Humphries, F., Maloney, M., Wright, G., Gjerde, K. M., & Vierros, M. (2020). Rights of Nature: Perspectives for Global Ocean Stewardship. Marine Policy, 104059. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2020.104059

Karan, L., & Clark, N. (2020). A Path to Creating the First Generation of High Seas Protected Areas: Science-based method highlights 10 sites that would help safeguard biodiversity beyond national waters. Retrieved from https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/reports/2020/03/a-path-to-creating-the-first-generation-of-high-seas-protected-areas

Schröter, M., van der Zanden, E. H., van Oudenhoven, A. P. E., Remme, R. P., Serna-Chavez, H. M., de Groot, R. S., & Opdam, P. (2014). Ecosystem Services as a Contested Concept: a Synthesis of Critique and Counter-Arguments. Conservation Letters, 7(6), 514-523. doi:https://doi.org/10.1111/conl.12091

Taylor, P. (2019). The Common Heritage of Mankind: Expanding the Oceanic Circle. In (pp. 142-150). Leiden, Niederlande: Brill | Nijhoff.

Tvedt, M. W., & Jørem, A. E. (2013). Bioprospecting in the High Seas: Regulatory Options for Benefit Sharing. The Journal of World Intellectual Property, 16(3-4), 150-167. doi:10.1002/jwip.12010

UNGA. (2022). Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 28 July 2022. 76/300. The human right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment. Retrieved from https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3983329?ln=en

Vadrot, A. B. M., Langlet, A., & Tessnow-von Wysocki, I. (2021). Who owns marine biodiversity? Contesting the world order through the ‘common heritage of humankind’ principle. Environmental Politics, 1-25. doi:10.1080/09644016.2021.1911442

Navigating the marine biodiversity regime complex – How will the BBNJ instrument interact with other organizations?

17. February 2023/in General /by MARIPOLDATA Team

By Arne Langlet and Simon Fellinger

This contribution is part of a MARIPOLDATA blog series on current developments and discussions about marine biodiversity negotiations – more specifically, 1) the negotiations towards an international legally binding instrument under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction (BBNJ) and 2) the second part of 15^th Conference of the Parties (COP15.2) to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). The recently published article “Not ‘undermining’ who? Unpacking the emerging BBNJ regime complex” informs the BBNJ negotiations by untangling the regime complex of existing international organizations (IOs) that operate in the field of marine biodiversity. We show that up to 52 IOs are perceived as potentially relevant for BBNJ which means that negotiators should carefully formulate the “not undermining” Article 4 of the draft text to strengthen cooperation among IOs in the implementation of the BBNJ agreement. The dataset underlying this publication has recently been made publicly available.

Will BBNJ become a pilot boat for sustainable ocean governance? (Pilot boat guiding a sailboat, Photo by Philipp Straub)

What does article 4 of the current BBNJ treaty draft refer to?

The BBNJ Agreement is intended to complement and cooperate with other marine biodiversity-related agreements administered by several IOs such as treaty secretariats, intergovernmental organizations, and regional bodies. Art 4.2 of the draft text mandates that the ‘Agreement shall be interpreted and applied in a manner that does not undermine relevant legal instruments and frameworks and relevant global, regional, subregional and sectoral bodies’. The article “Not ‘undermining’ who? Unpacking the emerging BBNJ regime complex” contributed to informing the negotiations by providing a list of IOs that have been associated to the BBNJ negotiations, addressing the “who” – or, more specifically, which IOs negotiators refer to when talking about “not undermining”. The observed multitude of IOs and their complex involvement in the negotiations have led scholars and delegates to describe the situation as a “regime complex”.

What are the effects of regime complexity?

Regime complexity, defined as ambiguity in international standards, inconsistent rules and obligations, and opportunities for “forum shopping,” poses a significant threat to the effectiveness of international cooperation. This is due to actors seeking to take advantage of legal incoherence and competition among international organizations (IOs) to select a negotiation forum that best serves their interests (Alter & Meunier, 2009; Gehring & Faude, 2013). Forum shopping can occur when IOs compete in response to regime complexity and can ultimately undermine the effectiveness of all involved regimes. (Henning & Pratt, 2020, p. 1).

While regime complexity has been shown to pose challenges to international cooperation, research has also revealed positive effects. Increased availability of resources (Kelley, 2009), expertise (Lesage and Van de Graaf, 2013), local knowledge (Yadav & Gjerde, 2020), improved flow of information (Pretty & Ward, 2001), diffusion of practices and management structures (Rosenkopf & Abrahamson, 1999), and increased resilience in times of crisis (Janssen et al., 2006) have been identified as potential benefits. However, these positive effects are dependent on the ability of IOs to engage in cooperation and support each other (Dai, 2002; Perez, Cohen & Schreiber 2019; Sofronova, Holley & Nagarajan, 2014). To maximize the positive effects of regime complexity, it is essential to foster cooperative relationships among IOs, rather than competitive ones. But it remains unclear what factors determine the character of cooperative relationships.

How to facilitate cooperative relationships?

The literature suggests that cooperation between IOs is facilitated by shared goals (Downie, 2021; Carlisle & Gruby, 2019) and a clear hierarchy (Henning & Pratt, 2020). In the case of the BBNJ agreement, the hierarchy is established by the predominant role of UNCLOS, which serves as a reference point for other regimes, including the ISA and the UNFSA. However, principles of environmental governance and conservation remained underdeveloped in UNCLOS, such as the requirements for environmental assessments or the duty to cooperate for the conservation of living resources in the high seas. The BBNJ agreement could specify such principles.

Differentiation, or clarifying differences in scope and tasks, have also been shown to support collaborative relationships and compliance in regime complexes (Henning & Pratt, 2020). In the context of the BBNJ agreement, clear differentiation of scope and tasks with other IOs, such as the FAO or CBD, could provide a basis for institutional cooperation. For example, the description of EBSAs from the CBD could be used to inform MPAs under BBNJ, or the FAO could benefit from clarifying the contribution of BBNJ to achieve the holistic and comprehensive conservation and sustainable use of all marine biodiversity species – including fish – in ABNJ.

Hence, the BBNJ instrument could become an important step to fulfilling UNCLOS’ vision as a ‘constitution of the ocean’ by providing overarching goals under which IOs cooperate with diverse mandates.

The case of RFMOs:

The risk that the current formulation of ‘not-undermining’ may be too wide is particularly present in relation to the exclusion of measures for fish. Observers have warned that if fish is excluded from the scope of BBNJ management in order not to undermine the mandate of FAO or RFMOs, fish may slip ‘through the governance net’, leaving many species that are fished or affected by fishing unregulated and unprotected (Crespo, 2019). Particularly for ABMTs/MPAs it is essential to involve FAO and relevant RFMOs in consultations for effective implementation of protective measures. From the RFMOs perspective, the spatial management provisions in the BBNJ Agreement could serve as a tool for RFMOs to achieve sustainable use objectives. From a BBNJ perspective, it could become a hub to increase engagement between IO secretariats, informed by a robust scientific and technical body. In order to promote cooperation and coordination, the BBNJ text should prioritize coherence and coordination over language on not undermining existing instruments. The International Union on (IUCN) has suggested revising the order of elements in Art 4 to reflect such prioritization.

The case of existing scientific and technical bodies:

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the Intergovernmental Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) are two further bodies with which BBNJ will interact. The knowledge those bodies aggregate is closely connected to the marine biodiversity regime, as climate change and biodiversity loss are interlinked – on land and in the ocean. Including the expertise of those bodies may have helpful effects for the identification of MPAs, particularly at the beginning of implementation of the treaty, when the BBNJ institutions build their own expertise while many characteristics of the scientific and technical body will likely be defined by the COP in the future.

Further, to strengthen the role of the scientific and technical body that will be established through article 49 of the BBNJ instrument, drawing on existing knowledge practices and lessons learned from IPCC and IPBES should be taken into account (Borie et al., 2021). Both bodies have proven track records for independently aggregating diverse and complex knowledge from a large network of experts, and for communicating it to decision-makers, which will be a key task for the BBNJ scientific and technical body. Yet, this body needs to be designed for the specific context of marine biodiversity (Beck et al., 2014). Strong institutional links between IPCC, IPBES and the future BBNJ scientific and technical body can help to enhance the knowledge base for decision-making by ensuring exchange and steady flow of information (Pretty & Ward, 2001).

References:

Alter, K. J., & Meunier, S. (2009). The Politics of International Regime Complexity. Perspectives on Politics, 7(1), 13-24. doi:10.1017/s1537592709090033

Beck, S., Borie, M., Chilvers, J., Esguerra, A., Heubach, K., Hulme, M., Lidskog, R., Lövbrand, E., Marquard, E., Miller, C., Nadim, T., Neßhöver, C., Settele, J., Turnhout, E., Vasileiadou, E., & Görg, C. (2014). Towards a Reflexive Turn in the Governance of Global Environmental Expertise. The Cases of the IPCC and the IPBES. GAIA – Ecological Perspectives for Science and Society, 23(2), 80–87. https://doi.org/10.14512/gaia.23.2.4

Borie, M., Mahony, M., Obermeister, N., & Hulme, M. (2021). Knowing like a global expert organization: Comparative insights from the IPCC and IPBES. Global Environmental Change, 68(12), 102261. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2021.102261

Carlisle, K., & Gruby, R. L. (2019). Polycentric systems of governance: A theoretical model for the commons. Policy Studies Journal, 47(4), 927-952.

Crespo, G. O., Dunn, D. C., Gianni, M., Gjerde, K. M., Wright, G., & Halpin, P. N. (2019). High-seas fish biodiversity is slipping through the governance net. Nat Ecol Evol, 3(9), 1273-1276. doi:10.1038/s41559-019-0981-4

Dai, X. (2002). Information Systems in Treaty Regimes. World Politics, 54(4), 405-436. doi:10.1353/wp.2002.0013

Downie, C. (2021). Competition, cooperation, and adaptation: The organizational ecology of international organizations in global energy governance. Review of International Studies, 1-21. doi:10.1017/S0260210521000267

Gehring, T., & Faude, B. (2013). The dynamics of regime complexes: Microfoundations and systemic effects. Global governance, 19(1), 119-130.

Henning, C. R., & Pratt, T. (2020). Hierarchy and differentiation in international regime complexes: A theoretical framework for comparative research. Unpublished manuscript.

Janssen, M., Bodin, Ö., Anderies, J. M., Elmqvist, T., Ernstson, H., Mcallister, R., R. J. , . . . Ryan, P. (2006). Toward a Network Perspective of the Study of Resilience in Social-Ecological Systems. Ecology and Society, 11(1), 1-20. doi:10.5751/ES-01462-110115

Kelley, J. (2009). The More the Merrier? The Effects of Having Multiple International Election Monitoring Organizations. Perspectives on Politics, 7(1), 59-64. doi:10.1017/S1537592709090094

Langlet, A., & Vadrot, A. B. M. (2023). Not ‘undermining’ who? Unpacking the emerging BBNJ regime complex. Marine Policy, 147, 105372. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2022.105372

Lesage, D., & van de Graaf, T. (2013). Thriving in complexity? the OECD system’s role in energy and taxation. Global governance, 19, 92.

Perez, O., Cohen, R., & Schreiber, N. (2019). Governance through Global Networks and Corporate Signaling. Regulation & Governance, 13(4), 447-469. doi:10.2139/ssrn.3265793

Pretty, J., & Ward, H. (2001). Social Capital and the Environment. World Development, 29(2), 209-227. doi:10.1016/S0305-750X(00)00098-X

Sofronova, E., Holley, C., & Nagarajan, V. (2014). Environmental Non-Governmental Organizations and Russian Environmental Governance: Accountability, Participation and Collaboration. Transnational Environmental Law, 3(2), 341-371. doi:10.1017/S2047102514000090

Rosenkopf, L., & Abrahamson, E. (1999). Modeling Reputational and Informational Influences in Threshold Models of Bandwagon Innovation Diffusion. Computational & Mathematical Organization Theory, 5(4), 361-384. doi:10.1023/A:1009620618662

Yadav, S. S., & Gjerde, K. M. (2020). The ocean, climate change and resilience: Making ocean areas beyond national jurisdiction more resilient to climate change and other anthropogenic activities. Marine Policy, 122, 104184. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2020.104184

Marine Issues and Digital Sequence Information at CBD COP15.2: Lessons and implications for the upcoming BBNJ negotiations?

17. February 2023/in General /by MARIPOLDATA Team

By Silvia Ruiz Rodríguez and Paul Dunshirn

This contribution is part of a MARIPOLDATA blog series on current developments and discussions about marine biodiversity negotiations – more specifically, 1) the negotiations towards an international legally binding instrument under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction (BBNJ) and 2) the second part of 15^th Conference of the Parties (COP15.2) to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). In this blog post, we elaborate on the discussions and outcomes of the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (GBF) and the CBD decision on digital sequence information (DSI) with a focus on marine issues. Additionally, we point out links with the second part of the 5th Intergovernmental Conference (IGC5.2) of the BBNJ negotiations

Opening plenary of the CBD COP 15.2. (Source: own ethnographic data)

Marine issues in the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework

The Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (GBF) aims to halt and reverse global biodiversity loss through the achievement of four goals by 2050 and 23 action-oriented targets by 2030. Such goals and targets contribute to the Agenda for Sustainable Development (CBD COP15.2, dec. 15.4, Annex, para. 26) and pave the way for states to achieve the “shared vision of living in harmony with nature” by 2050 (para. 3).

The GBF was negotiated by state parties to the CBD during the sessions of the Open-Ended Working Group on the Post-2020 Global Biodiversity Framework (WG2020), which met five times between August 2019 and December 2022 and delivered the GBF draft to the COP15.2. While there are numerous marine issues across different targets of the GBF, we focus on the discussions on targets 1, 2, and 3 at COP15.2 as the scope of application of these targets might be subject to different interpretations.

Spatial planning of activities

Target 1 aims to ensure that states implement management plans for activities carried out on all terrestrial and marine areas to decrease biodiversity loss. During COP 15.2, discussions on this target revolved around the geographical reach and types of ecosystems that the target would address, as well as its feasibility.

Similar to discussions throughout the sessions of the WG2020, states struggled over the application of the target to only areas within national jurisdiction or both areas within and beyond national jurisdiction. On the one hand, arguments for circumscribing target 1 to areas within national jurisdiction relied on a narrow interpretation of the applicability of the CBD to national jurisdiction (CBD art. 4) and its relation to other international instruments (CBD art. 22; Prip, 2022). On the other hand, arguments supporting the applicability of target 1 to areas within national jurisdiction and areas beyond national jurisdiction promoted the coexistence of CBD and UNCLOS on the high seas with regard to biodiversity protection (Prip, 2022).

States had heated debates about whether the target would “retain” “intact ecosystems” or “critical and intact ecosystems.” States of the Global North struggled over the protection of such ecosystems while states of the Global South provided an array of arguments against such references. Firstly, retaining “intact ecosystems” would place a disproportionate burden on states of the Global South, which have a higher extent of wild areas in comparison to states of the Global North. Secondly, most ecosystems have been affected by anthropogenic activities. Thirdly, the meaning of “critical ecosystems” is unclear.

Against this scenario, states of the Global North proposed to replace “intact ecosystems” with “ecosystems that are hard to restore.” This proposal was nevertheless not accepted by their counterparts of the Global South. In the spirit of compromise, states agreed to “bring the loss of (…) ecosystems of high ecological integrity, close to zero” under target 1.

Restoring degraded areas of ecosystems

Target 2 aims to restore 30% of degraded land, inland water and marine areas to improve the state of the ecosystems. Debates focused on the numeric element, the purpose of the target, as well as types of ecosystems and areas to restore.

Similar to discussions at the WG2020, disagreements lay on whether the number should be absolute or relative. State actors supporting an absolute number, such as the European Union (EU), the Russian Federation, Samoa, and Switzerland preferred to protect hectares of areas. The EU, particularly, aimed to refer to a billion hectares of areas. States supporting a relative number, such as Australia, Brazil, Dominican Republic, India, Maldives, and Mexico, among others aimed to protect a percentage of areas. Although absolute numbers are needed for calculating a relative one, states agreed on representing the numeric element as a percentage to keep consistency with target 3.

The purpose of the target was also a topic of debate. The EU proposed that the restoration of areas would achieve an “increase of area of natural ecosystems” while Argentina, Kenya, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom proposed that the restoration of areas would “enhance biodiversity, and ecosystem services, ecological integrity and connectivity.” The first option might imply a gradual geographic expansion of the reach of the target before 2030. In contrast, the second option fails to suggest such a gradual increase. Consensus was reached on the second option with the addition of “ecosystem functions,” giving states flexibility to restore natural ecosystems, as well as altered and managed ones like aquaculture ponds.

Implementation of protected areas

Target 3 aims to guarantee that states conserve 30% of land, inland water and marine areas through protected areas and other effective area-based conservation measures (OECMs) while recognizing the rights of Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities (IPLCs). Some of the disagreements focused on the numeric element and the scope of the application.

Similar to discussions throughout the sessions of the WG2020, the numeric element was an object of debate. At COP15.2, differences lay on the specific percentage (30%, 20%, 13%, or even 10%), and whether this percentage would apply to 1) terrestrial and inland water and 2) marine ecosystems together or separately. The higher the percentage, the more efforts states have to undertake to achieve the target. Moreover, applying the percentage to land, inland water and marine areas separately increases these efforts even further. This was particularly challenging for some states of the Global South whose economies depend on the extraction of natural resources for the most part. States could not reach a compromise in the open sessions of COP15.2, resulting in the solution of this issue by state ministers who agreed to protect 30% of 1) land and inland water and 2) marine areas separately. In other words, states would fail to reach the target if they protect 20% of terrestrial and freshwater areas and 10% of marine areas.

The scope of application of target 3 was also an object of debate. At COP15.2, states struggled over the conservation and management 1) “of all land and of ocean” or 2) “of terrestrial and inland water, and of coastal and marine areas.” As the “ocean” contains both national and international waters, reference to the “ocean” might have enabled the implementation of marine protected areas and OECMs in areas within and beyond national jurisdiction. Australia, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Israel, Maldives, Samoa, Saint Lucia, and Tonga, among others, supported this reference.

The wording “coastal and marine areas” has been interpreted in the context of the CBD as a phrase that mostly applies to national jurisdiction. It might also imply both national and international waters, providing interpretative flexibility to the text. Brazil, the EU, India, Norway, and the Russian Federation supported the reference to “coastal and marine areas” for consistency with Aichi target 11. Parties decided to refer to “coastal and marine areas” in target 3 despite the unconformity of countries that supported reference to the “ocean.”

Decision on DSI and its contribution to the GBF

A core element of the CBD is its system for access and benefit-sharing for genetic resources. The Nagoya protocol has introduced a system that attributes a substantial level of sovereignty to nation states over their genetic resources, requiring users to enter mutually agreed terms with provider countries to ensure the sharing of benefits. Importantly, this framework is generally limited to genetic materials, even though the relationship to DSI has always been a source of contention. As DSI is central to a range of Research and Development (R&D) activities, parties to the CBD strived to find solutions during COP15.2.. This resulted in several decisions on the nature of a future multilateral mechanism, some of which appear of particular importance to the BBNJ discussions.

As it relates to the very question of whether benefits from DSI should be shared, COP15.2 “agrees that the benefits from the use of digital sequence information on genetic resources should be shared fairly and equitably” (CBD COP, dec. 15.9, para. 2). This can be read as a general recognition that the CBD should develop a system beyond benefit-sharing on genetic materials. In preparation for BBNJ IGC-5.2, this has created a discussion about the meaning of the phrase ‘benefits from the use of DSI’. As some suggest (Oldham et al., 2023), this implies that benefits need to be assessed based on evidence of DSI use. In other words, monetary benefits cannot be shared if they are ‘decoupled’ from use, but need to be informed by individual or aggregate use. This interpretation of the decision essentially implies that some form of traceability needs to be implemented in combination with the future benefit-sharing system. The question about the extent to which monetary benefit-sharing on DSI and traceability need to go hand-in-hand will also be of key importance for the BBNJ negotiations, where it would make sense to find solutions compatible with the CBD decisions (Langlet & Dunshirn, 2023; Oldham et al., 2023).

Concerning the question of traceability, COP15.2 “recognizes that tracking and tracing of all digital sequence information on genetic resources is not practical” (CBD COP, dec. 15.9, para. 5). The discussions that have inspired this decision have revolved around the complexity of tracing DSI. Research practices involve comparing hundreds or thousands of DSI (Scholz et al., 2022). Thus, scientific observers to COP 15.2. have argued that a comprehensive track and trace system of all of these uses may cost more than it may contribute to the overall goal of establishing a monetary benefit-sharing system on DSI (Scholz et al., 2022). Additionally, a track and trace system on DSI can never be fully comprehensive, as users may download DSI and analyze or further share it directly outside the established infrastructures (Rohden et al., 2020). However, some commentators emphasize that the decision concerns track and trace of all DSI, implying that it may be practical for some DSI (Oldham et al., 2023).

COP15.2 also “decides to establish […] a multilateral mechanism for benefit sharing from the use of digital sequence information on genetic resources, including a global fund” (CBD COP, dec. 15.9, para. 16). This decision is a clear break with the bilateral access and benefit-sharing system for genetic resources introduced under the Nagoya protocol. Instead, it introduces a novel multilateral mechanism. The relationship between these novel multilateral and bilateral systems remains unclear, and it is conceivable that hybrid forms will be discussed moving forward. As some observers have argued, a multilateral system is particularly suitable for DSI, as many research practices may use DSI from hundreds of different origins in one search, making it hard to imagine how this should be dealt with in a purely bilateral manner (Scholz et al. 2022).

Overall, the decision on DSI provides guidelines for the further construction of a multilateral benefit-sharing mechanism. As guidelines, they are not legally binding and it is up to state parties to further sketch out the system they sketched out during COP15.2.

Why should we care about the CBD COP 15.2 when negotiating the BBNJ treaty during the coming weeks?

BBNJ negotiators should keep in mind discussions and outcomes of the CBD COP15.2 to facilitate synergies and collaboration between both instruments. Targets 1, 2, and 3 of the GBF are particularly relevant for the package element on area-based management tools, including marine protected areas.

Two outstanding, interrelated reasons come to the fore. Firstly, it is necessary to conduct marine spatial planning (GBF target 1) to implement area-based management tools and marine protected areas (GBF target 2), restore degraded marine ecosystems (GBF target 3) and protect the marine environment under the CBD and BBNJ instruments. Secondly, the ecological connectivity of the ocean – through species’ movement and genetics, horizontal and vertical currents, as well as culture – requires coherent management and protection measures across areas within and beyond national jurisdiction for the conservation and sustainable use of marine biodiversity (Dunn et al., 2019; Mossop & Schofield, 2021; Mulalap et al., 2020; O’Leary & Roberts, 2018; Popova et al., 2019; Tessnow-von Wysocki and Vadrot, 2022; UNEP‐WCMC, 2018). Agreeing on complementary and mutually supporting measures between the CBD and BBNJ instruments is essential for taking management and conservation actions that ensure species’ persistence and increase ecosystems’ productivity (Berger et al., 2022). This would improve the health of marine ecosystems and protect economic sectors, such as fisheries and tourism.

The CBD COP15.2 decision on DSI is also particularly relevant for the BBNJ negotiations as it is inextricably linked to the package element on marine genetic resources (MGRs). Some negotiating parties to BBNJ have so far opposed including DSI in the treaty text to not forgo CBD decisions. Now that the decisions are on the table, it will be a great opportunity for negotiators to work towards a harmonized multilateral system. Distinguishing DSI from areas beyond national jurisdiction and areas within national jurisdiction on the existing genetic sequence databases is generally tricky and at present not supported by database providers (Langlet & Dunshirn 2023). Establishing functional governance frameworks for MGRs is key to achieving sufficient legal certainty for users and enabling benefit-sharing and capacity-building for the Global South. Enabling a variety of communities to use and benefit from marine biotechnology can go a long way in establishing blue economies that work for both people at the same time as contributing to ecosystem conservation (Blasiak et al. 2023).

Cross-fertilization between the CBD COP15.2 and the BBNJ IGC5.2 is essential for the success of the international community in the efforts toward the conservation and sustainable use of marine biodiversity. It can only help to harmonize international marine legislation, bringing global environmental governance a step forward in its path to coherent and effective protection and management of the world’s oceans.

Silvia Ruiz Rodríguez and Paul Dunshirn are associated researchers of the ERC Project MARIPOLDATA. Paul is a prae-doc at the Research Platform Governance of Digital Practices. Silvia’s on-site participation at COP15.2 and WG2020-5 was possible due to the generous support of MARIPOLDATA, the sowi:docs Fellowship Programme and the advancement scholarship of the University of Vienna.

Maripoldata Blog

Life in the Ocean – a common heritage of the planet: Do we have a responsibility in the High Seas?

Navigating the marine biodiversity regime complex – How will the BBNJ instrument interact with other organizations?

Marine Issues and Digital Sequence Information at CBD COP15.2: Lessons and implications for the upcoming BBNJ negotiations?

Contact

Where to find us?